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Framing the Debate  
By K.R. Moore 
“Treason doth never prosper: what’s the reason? 
Why, if it prosper, none dare call it treason.” 
 
— Sir John Harington 
(4 August 1561 – 20 November 1612)1 
 
The Latin Vulgate Bible’s apocryphal first book of Esdras states that Cyrus the Great of Persia, a 
figure in whom the subject of this investigation would be keenly interested, was suitably 
impressed by Zorobabel’s argument, Magna est veritas et prævalet — “Great is the truth, and it 
prevails”, that he permitted the captive Jews to return to their homeland and rebuild their 
destroyed Temple.2 Still, it seems that even the truth, however great, cannot quite prevail over 
Alexander III of Macedon, the Great. His victorious record remains intact despite 2,300 plus 
years of near constant engagement on the battlefield of academia. Since we are concerned with 
his reception here, it is obligatory to concede that we may never know the “real” Alexander, if he 
may be said to exist at all. Much of that which we can hope to attain as the “truth” persists only 
amongst these receptions. Even so, I feel that I ought to also allow that the level of reasonably 
considered information obtainable from receptions, and especially from those closest to his own 
era, does offer us fleeting glimpses into his world and its major events. Those glimpses beckon 
scholarly champions, driving them into the affray, to both discover and to re-shape the life and 
times of Alexander. It is also clear that some receptions are so influenced by their own respective 
Zeitgeist and agendas that they border on solipsism; although this too affords volumes about our 
forebears and their eras. We like to think that contemporary scholarship is more objective. And 
rightly so. Yet, disputes still abound and are often particularly related to their analogues 
stemming both directly and by diverse routes from the time of the Macedonian Conqueror.  
The contributions that follow this chapter will explore many such receptions of 
Alexander the Great. They have been chosen to reflect the range and scale of the impact that 
scarcely a third of a century of prodigiously historical activity inflicted on a world that would 
itself be significantly transformed and fashioned in consequence of those very events. They will 
likewise explore various ongoing historical debates about these topics. The aim of this chapter, as 
its title suggests, is to “frame the debate” around Alexander. Of course, that statement is 
misleading as there are and have been numerous debates about him and it would be impossible 
to treat them all in this or any volume. Indeed, the Great Library of Alexandria itself would just 
begin to contain them all. What I intend to do here is to look closely at three selected “episodes”, 
presented through our primary sources, and examine some of the major arguments and debates 
about them within subsequent historiographical traditions. Such contested points will be 
illuminated when considered in context and with regard to trends in scholarship; but they will 
also be seen to have taken on a kind of Nachleben of their own, metatextually interacting with one 
another, echoing and being distorted—and sometimes even clarified—through the actions of 
time and the whims of fortune. Although, I also feel compelled to add that, whatever this 
chapter’s (or indeed this book’s) claims to any objectivity or “truth” concerning Alexander the 
Great, it should be acknowledged that this is, after all, ultimately just another reception, at best a 
post-scripted footnote to an obscure passage buried deep within a grand narrative which is itself 
mostly lost, in no small part imagined and perpetually contested. 
Framing the contentious debate(s) around Alexander, what he intended and what he 
signified, also requires choices to be made about which topics to examine and which to omit. 
                                                          
1 Epigrams, Book IV, Epistle 5. Cp. “Prosperum ac felix scelus/ Virtus vocatur” (“Successful and fortunate crime/ is called 
virtue”), Seneca, Hercules Furens, II.250. 
2 I Esdras 4:41; between 538 and 520 B.C.  
Thus yet another “Alexander” is here born to add to the growing legion that, if its inmates could 
somehow step beyond the written page and the minds that conceive them, would make up an 
army larger than that, reported in our sources, of Dareius III, King of Kings, near Issus in 
November of 333 B.C. So, let us then receive this new Alexander, with fanfare appropriate to his 
station, taking up our own panoply of scholarly arms and banners. The episodes to be scrutinised 
in this chapter will be the assassination of Alexander’s father Philip II of Macedon in 336, 
followed by the infamous razing of Thebes by Alexander in 335 and, finally, the fate of his 
historian Callisthenes of Olynthus in 327. Understandably, if regrettably, it is from the more 
grisly incidents credited to Alexander that the most heated debates tend to arise and I ask the 
reader to pardon my dwelling upon such unpleasant things for they are highly revealing. This 
chapter could also quite readily consider many more examples were there sufficient space and 
time. Such would, however, require at least a book and will be omitted, if occasionally 
referenced. I am aware too that this is well-trodden, scholarly ground; yet, a reappraisal of such 
points is, I think, important, by way of illustration. Looming large in all of these incidents and 
their receptions is what I consider to be the overarching debate: whether Alexander the Great 
was in fact just a “Lucky Tyrant” or, in some sense, a beneficent “Civiliser”, the promoter of the 
“Unity of (Hu)Mankind”. Of course the truth, whatever that is, will always be more complex. 
 
In the summer of 336 B.C., Philp II of Macedon was publicly assassinated during the wedding 
ceremony of his daughter Cleopatra to Alexander I, the Molossian client-king of Epirus, at the 
ancient Macedonian capital of Aegae, by Pausanias, son of Cerastus with a Celtic dagger. The 
latter was captain of Philip’s personal bodyguards and he clearly had some kind of grievance 
against his king.  This pivotal event was arguably the first true test of Alexander’s premiership 
and one which he passed, being acclaimed king by the Macedonian people under arms. He dealt 
promptly with a number of rivals and then set out to govern his realm and expand it. A debate 
arose around Alexander’s potential culpability in the untimely demise of his father. And this first 
episode that I am considering deftly exhibits the sheer perplexity encountered when trying to pin 
down precisely what happened in any key event for which we have information relating to 
Alexander’s thirteen-year, epic reign.  
 Beginning with the ancient sources, Plutarch (ca. A.D. 46 –120), the Platonist priest of 
Apollo at Delphi, sometime magistrate of Chaeronea and popular biographer of famous Greeks 
and Romans, gives us only a passing explanation of this. He is likely drawing on Cleitarchus’ 
(mid to late 3rd century B.C.) now lost, but by all accounts exceedingly popular, History of 
Alexander, which was probably written between 310 and 301 in Alexandria, perhaps around the 
same time as Ptolemy was writing his own History. Cleitarchus, the son of an historian named 
Deinon, is chiefly associated with his home city of Alexandria and not thought to have gone on 
the Persian expedition.3 He probably accessed the overly flattering History of Callisthenes (ca. 360 
– 328 B.C.) as a main source, along with tales gleaned from Macedonian soldiers living in Egypt 
at the time.4 Neither he nor Callisthenes were reported to have been present at the assassination 
of Philip; although, the latter may have been there, given his close association with the 
Macedonian court. 
Plutarch relates the tale of Pausanias having been sexually outraged by Attalus, one of 
Philip’s leading generals, (or under his auspices) perhaps up to eight years prior to the 
assassination and, having had no redress from the king, was seething in his desire for vengeance.5 
Diodorus gives a fuller account to which I shall shortly return. It is unclear why the assassin 
chose this moment, out of so many earlier opportunities, to exact his retribution. Persian gold, 
royal intrigues and the influence of the Athenian leader Demosthenes have all been advanced as 
                                                          
3 Heckel 2006, 86. 
4 See Cartledge 2005, 243 ff. 
5 Aristotle Politics 1311b.1-2, supports this account. 
causal factors but never adequately demonstrated.6 Certainly Alexander proceeded from the 
official position that the Persians were involved. Diodorus states that Pausanias was urged on to 
his treason by a hitherto unknown sophist named Hermocrates.7 Plutarch adds, without giving 
his own opinion, that “it was Olympias who was chiefly blamed for the assassination, because 
she was believed to have encouraged the youth and incited him to revenge”.8 She undoubtedly 
had grievances of her own, having fallen from grace as “first” wife and Queen and having 
endured exile and estrangement.9 But does that make her guilty? A hint of culpability is also 
aimed at Alexander insofar as Plutarch indicates that Pausanias went to him with his complaints 
against Attalus possibly at the time of the affront whereupon Alexander, at the age of about 
twelve, is said to have referenced the topic of revenge-murder, quoting from Euripides’ Medea 
(289), “The bride, the groom and the bride-giver”. But these words, if true, are open to much 
interpretation. At any rate, if Alexander actually said them, it was years before the actual 
assassination when Philip’s future bride, Attalus’ niece, would have been about nine and 
presumably before the eventual wedding with Philip had even been arranged (337 or 338 B.C.),10 
which makes it seem like this anecdote “may well have been invented after the fact” as a 
revisionist postscript by antagonistic sources.11 That is, it would be unless Pausanias approached 
Alexander around the time of the wedding to Attalus’ niece, but this is never clarified and it 
seems odd, though not impossible, that he would wait so long to seek help from the prince. 
 Plutarch accessed both the Vulgate (mainly Cleitarchus the Alexandrian historian, 
Onisicritus the helmsman and sensationalist, Chares of Mytilene who was Alexander’s court-
marshal, and sometimes Callisthenes, personal historian to the king) and the Official (mainly 
Pharaoh Ptolemy I Soter, Aristobolus the engineer, Nearchus the fleet admiral and, again, 
Callisthenes) traditions of Alexander scholarship but it seems clear that the most detailed 
account of the murder of Philip must come exclusively from the Vulgate sources and especially 
Cleitarchus. Arrian of Nicomedia (ca. A.D. 86/89 – after 146/160) only briefly mentions the 
death of the king in 336, and we can assume that Ptolemy, himself still in exile at the time over 
his involvement in the Pixodarus Affair, to be presently considered, either did not discuss it in 
his lost book, which was Arrian’s main source, or only did so, as with Arrian, in passing.12 The 
claim of Olympias’ involvement probably originated, in the early historiography at least, with 
Cleitarchus.13 The 1st century B.C. historian Diodorus Siculus, another who draws on the Vulgate 
tradition and Cleitarchus in particular, gives a much more detailed account of Pausanias’ 
grievance against, and animosity for, Philip but notably does not lay any blame on Olympias or 
Alexander.14 Quintus Curtius Rufus (ca. A.D. 1st century), another Vulgate writer, is muted on 
this topic since it would have been covered in his missing books; although, one suspects that he 
might have repeated or expanded upon the anti-Alexandrian calumnies. The final ancient source 
to address this matter is Justin’s Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus. There is 
much debate about when Justin lived (probably A.D. 2nd century) but Trogus, a Romanised Gaul, 
was writing roughly at the same time as Diodorus and likewise following Cleitarchus and the 
Vulgate tradition.15 And Trogus (and/or Justin) too lays blame on Olympias, who he says even 
provided the getaway horses, obliquely blaming Alexander as well. Justin indicates that “it is also 
believed that he [Pausanias] was encouraged to it by Olympias…and that Alexander himself was 
                                                          
6 Heckel 2006, 110-111. 
7 Diodorus Siculus Library of World History, XVI.9; this Hermocrates may have been the teacher of Callimachus the 
Alexandrian poet, for which see Funaioli, Real-Encyclopädie, VIII, 1920, col. 887 ff. 
8 Plutarch Alexander, X.4. 
9 See Tarn 1956, 3 ff.; and cp. Cartledge 2005, 61 ff. 
10 Green 1992. 
11 Freeman 2011, 42. 
12 Arrian Anabasis I.1 
13 Young 2014, 14-15. 
14 Diodorus XVI.94.1-4.  
15 Cartledge 2005 279. 
not ignorant of the murder of his father.”16 It is difficult to say whether this further accusation 
originated from Cleitarchus, Trogus or Justin himself (or some hitherto unknown text). The fact 
that Diodorus omitted it may tell us more about his own inclinations, that he was more 
favourable to Alexander through admiration of him, much as with Plutarch, rather than revealing 
the source of this purported intelligence.17 He may have also made a critical choice based on his 
researches. Even if he was favourable to Alexander, the omission of the queen as a suspect is 
telling. It does seem clear that the allegations of Alexander and Olympias’ culpability derive 
almost exclusively from the Vulgate tradition rather than the Official, which is to be expected.18 
 Amongst the modern receptions the difference of opinion manifests along similar lines 
but with greater magnitude. A good place to begin is with Sir William Woodthorpe Tarn (26 
February 1869 – 7 November 1957). Granted, one could look to George Grote (17 November 
1794 – 18 June 1871) or a range of earlier sources that partake of the long tradition of Alexander 
scholarship; however, others in this volume will address these far better in their chapters and I 
shall not infringe too much on their bailiwicks. Tarn, along with his rival the Austrian-born Ernst 
Badian (8 August 1925 – 1 February 2011), effectively laid the groundwork for the modern 
debates and most scholars in the later 20th and early-21st centuries have followed on from these. 
In his tersely concise prose, Tarn writes: 
   
Antipater’s attitude absolutely acquits Alexander of complicity. Olympias may 
have been privy to the plot; but the only evidence against her is Antipater’s 
subsequent enmity to her, for our tradition on the subject derives from 
Cassander’s propaganda later.19 
 
I will address Cassander’s alleged influences in time. Tarn’s position is disputed by Badian who 
develops an elaborate conspiracy theory making Alexander, with the help of his mother, the 
originator of the regicide.20 Paul Cartledge, almost half a century later would echo that view. He 
begins tentatively enough, exploring the possibility as a hypothetical exercise, but by his third 
reason in favour of Alexander’s complicity (having Pausanias killed rather than put on trial), 
Cartledge seems convinced. However, perhaps grudgingly, he comments that the case against 
him is “cumulatively impressive, but not proven beyond a shadow of reasonable doubt”; he 
nonetheless states that Alexander “benefitted the most” from Philip’s death.21 
 Even so, it is also easy enough to find reputable, modern scholars who argue that 
Alexander had relatively little to gain by Philip’s murder, that the king’s sudden demise could 
have potentially weakened his position and thrown open a power struggle that he was by no 
means guaranteed to win.22 Some even argue, based on Alexander’s piety as attested in a range of 
sources that parricide, with its associated miasma, would have been unthinkable to the highly 
religious prince.23 This depends, of course, upon whether one believes him to have actually been 
religious or whether, more cynically, he used religion purely as a means to political power. Some 
combination of the two might be closer to the truth but there can be no doubt that the stain of 
parricide would have been damning.24 It is also the case that Alexander’s relationship with his 
father had suffered at times. This was due in part to Philip’s marriage into Attalus’ family in 338 
or early 337, as this general appears to have held Alexander in contempt. Attalus, in his cups 
after the wedding, reportedly “called upon the Macedonians to beseech the gods that from Philip 
                                                          
16 Justin Epitome, IX.7.1-2 
17 Cartledge 2005, 256. 
18 See Anson 2013, 74-77. 
19 Tarn 1956, 3; see Anson 2013, 81 in support of Antipater’s stance on Alexander. 
20 Badian 1963, 244-50; 2000, 54-6. 
21 Cartledge 2005, 63-65, 13.  
22 Renault 1975, 62-63; his success was hardly a foregone conclusion; see Anson 2013, 79. 
23 See Anson 2013, 79. 
24 See Fredricksmeyer 2003, 253 ff. 
and Cleopatra might be born a legitimate successor to the kingdom” thus insulting Alexander 
who became livid at the remarks.25 Plutarch reports that he was about to come to blows with 
Attalus when Philip, also very drunk, arose and drew his sword only to fall down and be 
subjected to Alexander’s ridicule, saying “Look now, men! Here is one who was preparing to 
cross from Europe into Asia; yet he is distressed in trying to cross from couch to couch!”26 
Alexander then took his mother to Epirus and went himself to Illyria in self-imposed exile.27 
The Pixodarus Affair is another incident that reveals tensions between father and son.28 
Alexander, with help from his closest friends, had derailed Philip’s plan to marry off his half-
brother, Arrhidaeus, to the daughter of the Satrap of Caria by offering himself as bridegroom 
instead. Ruzicka places this episode as occurring while Alexander was still in Illyria, probably in 
337.29 Philip persuaded his son to return, although a number of the prince’s closest companions, 
including our Ptolemy, were sent into exile by the king for their unsanctioned involvement in 
foreign affairs. Contrary to Badian’s position, Philip appears to have thought very highly of his 
son, considering him unequivocally as heir-apparent.30 Not only was Philip instrumental in 
obtaining his return to court, after putting a halt to any marriage arrangement with the Carian, 
but Alexander was also sufficiently important in his father’s eyes not to be pawned off on a 
minor Persian noble who had been a bitter enemy in 340. Philip had reserved that honour for his 
half-witted son Arrhidaeus, who was never intended to inherit the throne, in order to cement ties 
of friendship with a former opponent.31 It was a diplomatic manoeuvre typical of Philip and it 
speaks volumes that he forgave his son for scuppering the deal. Alexander’s position seems to 
have been fairly secure. Any child of the king by Attalus’ niece, however purely Macedonian, 
would be years from becoming a suitable successor, if it ever did; whereas, the half-Epirote 
Alexander, who had successfully acted as regent in his father’s absence at the age of sixteen and 
commanded the left wing of the Macedonian army at Chaeronea in 338, had proven himself fit 
for rule time and again. This was affirmed by his restoration to favour even after the episode 
with Attalus and the Pixodarus Affair. Family tensions and headstrong children are universal 
phenomena but they do not automatically equate to plots of murder. 
Many others have added their voices to this “trial by historians” of Alexander and 
Olympias and it would take considerable time to go through them all. Mary Renault has even 
asserted that it would be a “waste of space to re-examine” the debate.32 That may be going a bit 
far but this case does serve to illustrate that one can, as Badian, Cartledge and others have done, 
construct an elaborate edifice of reasoned suspicion and supposition to back up a claim of 
complicity.33 For example, Robin Lane Fox argues that “for Olympias, the murder had been 
timed and planned ideally; Philip was killed at the wedding designed to discard her”; he considers 
Alexander’s potential involvement too but argues that it amounts largely to “speculation”, saying 
that it is “Olympias who remains most suspect”.34 If the allegation comes from Cleitarchus, as it 
appears to have done, then this view may have been derived from the gossip of the common 
soldiers, who probably were not privy to all the facts. It almost certainly derives from the time 
after Alexander when Cassander’s anti-Olympias propaganda may have also informed and 
influenced that gossip.35 In addition to politically opposing Cassander, Olympias would execute 
his brother, Nicanor, claiming that she was avenging Cassander’s reputed involvement in her 
                                                          
25 Plutarch Alexander, IX.4-5. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Plutarch Alexander, IX.4-5; Athenaeus Deipnosophistae, 557d-e; Justin IX.7.2-5. 
28 Plutarch Alexander, X.1-3. 
29 Ruzicka 2010, 10, although this is contested; see his notes passim; and see Plutarch Alexander, IX.6. 
30 Ruzicka 2010, 8; see Worthington 2014, 113-15, who agrees that Alexander’s position was relatively secure. 
31 See Anson 2013, 76-77. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Cartledge 2005, 16, 64 & passim. 
34 Fox 2004, 23-25; but see Carney 2006, 39 ff. for a fuller discussion this. 
35 See Waterfield 2011, 88-91. 
son’s demise.36 It is noteworthy that Alexander himself was never implicated in the murder of his 
father during his lifetime, to our knowledge, even in the latter part of his Asiatic campaign when 
a number of his subordinates were accusing him of a great many wrongdoings. 
The assassin Pausanias may not have acted alone, but “our sources primarily describe the 
murder as of a very personal nature”.37 While it was successful, this could also explain why no 
higher, political goals were achieved such as bringing Philip’s nephew, Amyntas Perdicca, son of 
the previous king and Philip’s brother, Perdiccas III, to power.38 It seems more like revenge than 
coup d’état. Pausanias was a royal bodyguard from Orestis who Diodorus indicates was at least at 
one point “beloved of the king” and apparently quite jealous of other would-be beloveds.39 If 
true, then that establishes a special relationship between the murderer and his monarch that casts 
a particular light on Philip’s failure to redress his outrage. According to Diodorus’ version, 
Pausanias had fallen out of favour as the king’s lover and then embarked on a smear campaign 
against his replacement, another youth also named Pausanias who was a friend of Attalus and 
who is reported to have died in a battle against the Illyrians.40 Diodorus asserts that his death was 
actually suicide as a result of the other Pausanias’ unbearable defamations against him.41 Perhaps 
out of a sense of outrage, Attalus “plied him with un-mixed drink” and handed the future 
regicide over to his mule drivers to have their way with him. This happened approximately eight 
years prior to Philip’s assassination. Plutarch says the rapists were fellow “revellers” at the party; 
Diodorus refers to them as Attalus’ “mule drivers”.42  They could have easily been both. 
Pausanias was a teenager and a Royal Page at that point rather than captain of the bodyguards, as 
he would be at the time of the murder.43 He was also an aristocrat, with a high sense of personal 
worth and privilege. And he had been raped—not just raped, but drugged by a superior and 
gang-raped perhaps by social inferiors—and had received no justice from Philip who had been at 
once probably his lover and was unquestionably a “father figure” as his king and commander. In 
terms of the latter’s declining to redress the wrong, possibly Philip felt that the slanderous youth 
had received his just desserts. Now, we cannot know what went through Pausanias’ mind; but, a 
traumatic experience like that was bound to leave a profound impact and Diodorus’ reports 
suggest he was given to emotional extremes. One may postulate that he nursed this grievance 
throughout the intervening years; he probably dwelt upon it to an unhealthy degree, let it eat 
away at him. We should perhaps feel some pity for Pausanias; although, there can be no 
justification for his actions.  
We also cannot know whether Olympias, Alexander or others who knew of this took 
advantage through “poisoned” words of encouragement; but, the wedding at Aegae marked an 
acme in Philip’s career and seeing his king at this moment, dressed in shining white robes, being 
honoured like a god at the height of his power and prestige, could have easily been the last 
proverbial straw. Pausanias might have got his revenge at any time, or never, but the moment 
was ripe for it. Some premeditation seems likely. He would have had time to prepare, being chief 
bodyguard and knowing the royal itinerary in detail. Diodorus’ account suggests some planning 
as the assassin had horses readied for a swift getaway, failing to reach them in time only because 
he tripped on a vine in his precipitous flight and fell.44 Justin alone, as indicated above, suggests 
that Olympias herself had organised the escape animals. If Diodorus is reporting correctly, then 
                                                          
36 Diodorus XIX.11.8; see too Heckel 2006, 176-7. 
37 Anson 2013, 74; Aristotle Politics, 1311b1, supports Diodorus’ position that Pausanias acted alone. 
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39 Diodorus XVI.93.2-4. 
40 See Freeman 2011, 39-40. 
41 Diodorus XVI.93.6; he called him an hermaphrodite, amongst other things. 
42 Plutarch Alexander, 10; Diodorus XVI.93.2-4. 
43 Heckel 2006, 193-194. 
44 Diodorus XVI.94.3-4. 
this was more than a sudden psychological episode and appears to have been planned to make 
Philip’s fall all the more tragically ironic in the context of his celebratory accolades.  
The apparent, summary execution of the regicide without trial might have been 
absolutely necessary in order to cement Alexander’s position as heir-apparent; but he may not 
have had any choice in the matter. A murder had been witnessed by a multitude and the killer 
was manifestly guilty. Today we would expect a lengthy forensic investigation and trial by jury. 
Had Pausanias been spared at that moment for a future trial, on Alexander’s order, this might 
have actually implicated Alexander in his crimes by providing the assassin with the opportunity 
for escape, which could well have happened.45 Swift action seems to have been required—
Pausanias was clearly “resisting arrest” by fleeing—and justice needed to be seen to have been 
done. We do not even know for certain that Alexander had anything directly to do with 
Pausanias’ execution. Diodorus says that Perdiccas, Leonnatus and Attalus (probably the son of 
Andromenes, not Philip’s father-in-law who was in Asia with Parmenion leading the spearhead 
invasion) killed him with javelins—and Alexander is not mentioned here amongst them.46 
Plutarch alludes to Alexander hunting down “others” considered to have been involved in the 
plot, suggesting there was a conspiracy of some kind; but, nowhere are we explicitly told that he 
personally ordered the killer’s execution.47 
Pausanias was from Orestis, a region of upper Macedonia corresponding roughly to the 
modern-day Kastoria district, which had been assimilated by Philip after a series of bloody 
battles. Leonnatus has sometimes been thought to have also come from Orestis; however, Fox 
and Heckel have demonstrated that he was a relative of Eurydice, the mother of Philip II, and 
therefore a member of the Lycestian “royal line”, which itself had been thwarted in its 
aspirations for agnatic control of the crown of Macedon by Philip in his earlier rise to 
supremacy.48 This Attalus was Perdiccas’ brother-in-law and both men were nobles from Orestis. 
Conspiracy hunters may argue that they killed him to silence his bearing witness to their 
involvement in the plot which, given Perdiccas’ eventual role as somatophylax of, and diadochus to, 
Alexander, could be seen to implicate him if true; but there is no proof of such a plot beyond the 
implication. Indeed, most of the individuals present amongst the royal retinue at Aegae on that 
day were probably related to each other in some way, whether by region, marriage or 
acquaintanceship of varying degrees and many of them probably had grievances against their 
king. Any or all of them may have had sufficient motive to participate in such a plot; but that 
alone does not condemn them. It is also unquestionably the case that more than one 
Macedonian monarch came to the throne by means of assassinating his predecessor but that too 
is insufficient to return a verdict on Alexander.49 I would like to think that there is no evidence to 
convict him, or his mother, here. Perhaps I am afflicted by similar biases to those of Diodorus 
and Plutarch but I freely admit that, as Wood writes, “although it has never been proved, [it] is 
not impossible” that the twenty year-old prince was involved in some capacity.50 The truth will 
likely never be known; but that will hardly stop historians from arguing over this matter and 
continuing to prosecute Alexander for the crime of parricide by proxy.  
 
The legacy of Thebes’ annihilation would resonate throughout Alexander’s life and beyond; but, 
we must be careful not to judge him by later standards. It is also important to remember that he 
was only Alexander III of Macedon, an unproven successor to Philip II, when these events 
transpired. He was not yet Alexander the Great. Even so, this episode is one of the most 
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49 See Carney 2003, 235. 
50 Wood 1997, 32. 
controversial in the Conqueror’s career and would be a defining factor in his reception. In 335 
B.C., whilst Alexander was putting down a revolt amongst the Illyrians and other northern 
tribesmen who had taken the opportunity of Philip’s demise to challenge Macedonian hegemony, 
Thebes revolted from the League of Corinth, spurred on by Demosthenes in Athens and the 
rumour that Alexander had perished, not unlike his uncle Perdiccas III in 359, fighting the 
northerners.51 On hearing of this news, Alexander, very much alive, undertook a lightning march 
with his forces and arrived to besiege Thebes within a fortnight of their initial rebellion. The 
story is well known: Thebes refused to surrender; it was defeated; many of its male citizens of 
military age were put to death, the women and children sold into slavery and the city and its 
famous walls were razed to the ground apart from certain sacred sites along with the house of 
the poet Pindar. It may seem to us ironic that a similar doom had recently been inflicted upon 
the Thracian Getae on the far bank of the Danube, along with a number of other cities of the 
Thracians and Triballians, on Alexander’s orders, according to Arrian by way of Ptolemy, and no 
one in Greece appears to have batted an eyelid at the lot of these “barbarians”.52 Greeks were 
another matter. That Alexander would exact such a harsh penalty on the civilised sons of Hellas 
sent shockwaves throughout the land, echoing down the corridors of time. This both tarnished 
his reputation and, at once, reinforced his authority over the other League city-states pondering 
defection. Athens demurred further fomenting of dissent, at least overtly, and sought peaceful 
terms with Macedon and only Sparta and her allies, with Persian backing, would later undertake 
rebellion in 331, whilst Alexander was away campaigning in Asia.  
 The destruction of Thebes certainly resulted in much controversy and this is to be found 
in both the Vulgate and Official traditions of the primary sources. Arrian’s account almost 
certainly derives from the lost History of Ptolemy and it offers one of the few occasions where we 
can be reasonably certain that the latter probably “fudged” the truth in order to slander a later 
opponent.53 Arrian writes that, according to Ptolemy son of Lagus, Perdiccas began the assault 
on the city without orders, thus pre-empting whatever Alexander’s plans might have been.54 This 
is plainly contradicted by Diodorus who indicates that Alexander himself gave the order to 
attack.55 Perdiccas would be Ptolemy’s rival in the Wars of the Successors and so the future 
Pharaoh of Egypt undertook some creative character assassination by means of revisionist 
history.56 Perhaps too Ptolemy sought to exonerate his friend and king to an extent by deflecting 
some of the onus onto an impatient subordinate; but, it can do little to exculpate Alexander for 
the eventual consequences of that attack. Ptolemy usually has no qualms about describing the 
fate of rebels in gory detail and Thebes is no exception. 
 Arrian also states that Alexander gave the Thebans multiple opportunities to back down 
from their revolt in order to treat with him diplomatically, but that they stubbornly refused.57 
This is corroborated by both Plutarch and Diodorus.58 The latter source includes a substantial 
description of their refusal, adding treasonous language and expressions of Persian sympathies to 
the crimes of the rebels, saying that they invited the host of Macedonians and their Boeotian 
allies “to join the Great King and Thebes in destroying the tyrant of Greece”.59 Diodorus 
indicates that this enraged Alexander and may have influenced his eventual treatment of the 
conquered Thebans. Plutarch reports a similar statement of treason, imploring “all those who 
wished to liberate Greece” to rally to their side; although, he omits any reference to the Persians 
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here as allies against Macedonian hegemony.60 Perhaps Diodorus inserted the allusion to the 
Persians in order to explain or justify the king’s wrath against a city that proposed to side with 
the enemy, in keeping with his pro-Alexander bias, or perhaps some of the soldiers whom his 
source, Cleitarchus, interviewed in Alexandria recalled these statements being shouted from the 
walls by the city’s defenders. Ptolemy could not have been everywhere on the battlefield and 
others would have seen and heard things that he missed. Justin/Trogus discusses Alexander’s 
initial forbearance also stating, albeit in the rather simplified language of the Epitome, that the 
Thebans had “revolted from him to the Persians”.61 It would be interesting to see what the 
missing books of Curtius Rufus would have added to this discussion because we have at least 
two sources from the Vulgate tradition that maintain Persian complicity. Cleitarchus again seems 
likely to have originated the historiography on this but, if there were any truth to it, why is it then 
absent from the Official tradition as it would have made for excellent propaganda?  
 Treasonous Thebans aside, Alexander’s allies certainly appear to have played a major role 
in the aftermath. Diodorus names these as Thespians, Plataeans, Orchomenians and “some 
others hostile to Thebes”; Justin gives Phocians, Plataeans and Orchomenians; however Plutarch 
and Arrian only mention Phocians and Plataeans.62 Diodorus says that, after the Theban forces 
were routed, these Boeotian allies, much moreso than the Macedonians, ransacked the city for 
pillage and engaged in a general slaughter. They used the opportunity to give free reign to their 
vengeance, having built up many grievances from the time when they had been oppressed by the 
erstwhile Theban Hegemony.63 Plutarch, Arrian and Justin agree with this interpretation. The 
crux of the matter, of course, is the decision of how to deal with the traitorous city-state once it 
was defeated. There is some notable contrast here in at least one primary source. After 
enumerating a range of past iniquities by Thebes, which included oppressing her subjects, aiding 
the Persians and voting to have Athens razed after its defeat by Sparta in 404, Arrian writes that: 
   
The allied troops who had taken part in the fighting were entrusted by Alexander 
with the ultimate settlement of the fate of Thebes. They decided to garrison the 
Cadmeia, but to raze the city to the ground.64 
   
Diodorus gives a more detailed account but says essentially the same.65 Justin also provides a 
fairly vivid (for him) narrative of the allies, listing their complaints against Thebes, of a Theban 
captive named Cleadas making a case for mercy, which was rejected, and of the Boeotian allies’ 
final, wrathful decision to have the city destroyed, its territories parcelled out amongst them.66 
Plutarch breaks rank from these versions, saying that “the city was stormed, plundered and razed 
to the ground” as an example to “frighten the rest of the Greeks into submission”, putting forth 
as an excuse that Alexander was also “redressing the wrongs done to his allies”.67 Unusually 
Plutarch, who is normally quite pro-Alexander, ascribes blame directly to him, citing the allies 
merely as a pretext, and this appears to have been more a view of his own rather than something 
explicitly stated in his sources. He also adds that Alexander felt “distressed” about Thebes in 
later years and that this made him “milder in the treatment of other peoples”.68 Hammond has 
reasonably demonstrated that Diodorus, Plutarch and Justin/Trogus are all using Cleitarchus as 
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their main source for this episode and, if so, then the differences would seem to be largely down 
to individual interpretations.69 
 As is perhaps to be expected, modern historians have had a field day with the destruction 
of Thebes. Those who seek to vilify Alexander seize upon it as proof positive of his tyranny. 
Others seek to rationalise it; but, even his apologists struggle with the doom visited upon the city 
of Cadmus. It is interesting that the similar fate of the Getae tends to get little mention by either 
camp and this seems to indicate a pro-Hellenic prejudice, perhaps even unconsciously, having 
been transmitted down through the dusty annals of history from the primary sources.  Tarn 
states that, while the king left the decision to the League of Corinth, the only members present 
were enemies of Thebes and so “the responsibility lies with Alexander”.70 He also considers the 
destruction of Thebes to have been one of the most “terrible crimes on his record”, alongside 
the murder of Parmenion and the treatment of Massaga; but, he also cautions that only those 
who have known the “temptations of power can judge”.71 He does place the responsibility 
entirely on Alexander, though, and clearly considers it to have been a tragic mistake. Fox, who 
advised Oliver Stone on the 2004 film, is perhaps one of the most objective and thorough of 
Alexander scholars in his research; he may no less be inclined to favour a more positivist version 
of Alexander at times. Yet, he also regards the decision to have been Alexander’s, discussing the 
same range of arguments mitigating Thebes’ destruction due to the Boeotians, concluding that 
the “allies would naturally have decreed their approval of an act which they were too frightened 
to condemn”.72 Cartledge is more forthright, saying that “the order was given, formally on the 
decision of the Council of the League of Corinth but really at Alexander’s behest (we may safely 
infer)”.73 He considers this to have been a case of Realpolitik and elaborates that “Alexander 
decided to cow into submission by an act of extreme political violence the allies whose anti-
Persian crusade he was supposed to be leading”, revealing the true face of the twenty-one year-
old king, indicating that he only gave lip-service to his much vaunted policy of Pan-Hellenism 
when it suited him.74 This comes across as a kind of more extreme take on Plutarch’s 
interpretation, echoing the same sentiments however enlarged.  
Plutarch and Arrian’s philosophical leanings might permit them to forgive Alexander 
when he regretted the fate of Thebes, but not Paul Cartledge; although, considering that he has 
mainly written on the Spartans, whose opinion of the Conqueror is well known, it is possible to 
hypothesise that their predisposition may have influenced his interpretation, which typically 
inclines more towards that of “Alexander the Tyrant”. And this view is by no means isolated, 
although it varies by degrees between scholars in terms of the extent of culpability ascribed. 
Worthington, for example, considers this one of the “darkest episodes” in the king’s career; even 
so, while placing the blame squarely on Alexander, who he says used the allies to deflect personal 
responsibility, he also points out that Thebes may have been harbouring Amyntas Perdicca, a 
rival for the Macedonian throne. 75 Treacherous disloyalty could expect such rewards and Philip 
II had visited a similar fate on Olynthus because they had given quarter to two of his step-
brothers who also claimed the crown. Andrew Young’s outstanding work reconstructing the lost 
book of Ptolemy argues that the latter sought to re-focus blame onto the Boeotian allies. He 
ultimately sides with Plutarch’s view that Alexander knew exactly what would become of Thebes 
and fully endorsed it. Young points out that in all other conflicts north and east, “in every other 
account throughout the campaigns it was Alexander who made the decision on what to do with a 
given city after being taken”; the fate of Thebes being determined by the League of Corinth in 
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whatever form, he argues, “stands out as possibly apocryphal”.76 Young considers it unusual to 
portray Alexander as “barely in control of the situation”, passing the decision over to vengeful 
allies. Even if that were true, he argues, the king must have known what the outcome would be 
beyond any shadow of doubt.  
Even so, Mary Renault sees Thebes as an exception in a number of ways. She asserts that 
Alexander could have personally decided the fate of a captured city in Thrace, Illyria or Asia 
where his authority was absolute.77 Thebes was different. Apart from Chaeronea (338 B.C.), 
which predates the League of Corinth, this was the only occasion on which Alexander 
campaigned personally against League-member Greeks who were not mercenaries in the pay of 
the Persian king. This and the wars conducted in response to the provocations of the Spartans, 
who were in collusion with Persia, by his regent Antipater in ca. 331, as Worthington writes, 
“were the first and only punitive actions carried out in defence of the Common Peace treaty by 
the general body of the signatories after decisions reached by a set procedure”.78 Thebes had 
manifestly reneged on its oath to the League by attacking the Macedonian garrison in the 
Cadmeia and was in open rebellion.79  Failure to settle the matter with Thebes, and to settle it 
sharply, could have entailed severe repercussions for the unity of the League of Corinth, not to 
mention the problems it would have posed to Alexander’s premiership.  
The influence of the other League members present at Thebes should not be dismissed. 
Renault states: 
  
…the Thebans were familiar enemies, against whom generations of hatred had 
been stored. Before Philip’s intervention, the Phocian War had been marked with 
heinous savageries. The atrocities of the lately betrayed Plataeans, if anyone’s 
fault but their own, may most fairly be blamed upon Demosthenes.80  
 
The latter, in his de facto capacity as leader of Athens, had urged Athenian involvement and 
reportedly supplied arms to the Phocians, Plataeans and others against Macedon.81 These highly 
relevant past grievances aside, Alexander’s relationship with the League of Corinth was different 
from that with other political players. It perhaps comes down to the issue of whether the League 
was only a sinecure or whether Alexander took this special relationship seriously—again, 
whether he was a tyrant or otherwise. The fact that he limited his actions to mainly dealing with 
insurrections rather than micro-managing their societies, as Cassander and other Successors 
would do, suggests something different from tyranny. Make no mistake here: the Common 
Peace of the League of Corinth favoured Macedon and its king; yet, Alexander III appears to 
have respected the traditions and autonomy of individual Greek poleis—insofar as they behaved 
themselves within the strictures of the treaty. He was surely an autocrat in Asia, but a nominally 
constitutional monarch, albeit with extraordinary discretion, in Macedon and Greece.82 
Arrian says that Alexander arrived at Thebes, by his lightening march, with his “whole 
force”.83 How large was this force and how many troops were there from the allies? Arrian does 
not give precise figures, apart from 2,000 Agrianes and archers, for whom Alexander had sent 
whilst fighting the northern tribes and which, along with the remainder of his forces from those 
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struggles, were presumably present at Thebes.84 Diodorus offers a figure of 30,000 infantry and 
3,000 cavalry, “all seasoned veterans”, which might be an exaggeration but it is difficult to say by 
how much.85 We neither know how many of the allies were present nor how many defenders 
held Thebes; but, a well-defended strongpoint almost always has the initial advantage in siege 
warfare and Diodorus comments that the Thebans, though outnumbered, were “superior in 
bodily strength” due to their constant practicing in their gymnasia.86 Plutarch and Diodorus both 
agree that 6,000 Theban soldiers died as a result of the battle.87 They disagree on the number 
sold into slavery, with Plutarch giving 20,000 and Diodorus 30,000, and it is unclear how many 
of these were non-combatants. Diodorus says that Alexander realised 440 talents of silver (about 
11,440 kg) from their sale but this does not clarify the number or type of prisoners taken.88 
Neither do we know how many Thebans escaped. Diodorus mentions a “a gift of weapons” and 
heavy armour to the Thebans from Demosthenes in Athens, but no reinforcements, along with 
some troops coming from the Peloponnesians who waited at the isthmus but did not join in the 
struggle; and he also mentions that the Thebans were using their recently enfranchised slaves in 
defence.89 Alexander’s forces, including the allies, surely outnumbered the Thebans; although, the 
numbers may have been close and the defenders had some advantages that might have offset 
this if only to some degree. 
What does seem certain, despite the lack of clarity about exact numbers, is that the 
Greeks were divided in their support of Alexander, whether philosophically or in actuality. The 
Athenians and Spartans were anti-Alexander (and the latter were not League members) but chose 
to “wait and see” the outcome of the battle before committing troops. It appears that many 
other Greek poleis took a similar tack. The Boeotian allies were clearly supporting Alexander in 
his cause, albeit perhaps on account of their past relations with the Thebans. This was no 
academic debate; although, it very much reflects the shape of such debates that would issue from 
these events. And the case could be made that by “voting with their feet”, so to speak, the 
Boeotian allies had earned the right to determine the fate of Thebes, in League Council alongside 
the Macedonians and their hegemon, whereas the others, if only by being conspicuously absent, 
had not. Thebes had broken her oath to the League, which had been made to “Philip or his 
heirs”, to maintain the Common Peace; those who sent arms were also in violation for helping 
the rebels and those who did not send aid to Alexander “to make war against transgressors” who 
broke the oath could be seen as likewise in violation.90 Granted, on the issue of aid, the oath 
specified that it should be rendered if requested, and we do not know who was requested to help 
or who was not, so that might to a point exonerate any who did not participate in punishing 
Thebes without being asked. 
So what if Alexander knew how the League members present would vote; does that 
make him personally responsible for the fate of Thebes? Anson agrees that it was a League 
decision but states that “it is clear that Alexander could have saved the city if he wished”.91 But 
could he? Had he not gone along with their decision, then he might have been faced with an 
army of disaffected allies, with hostile Arcadians waiting just round the corner and a range of 
other poleis looking for an opportunity to pounce. One might expect, with Arrian’s military 
background, that he would have made this same argument; although, perhaps his source, 
Ptolemy, played down the prospect for propagandistic reasons, emphasising the cowing of any 
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aims at broader rebellion through Thebes’ crushing defeat.92 But Alexander might have easily 
found himself with battle-exhausted troops besieged in the very city that he had just conquered, 
its defences now spent, cut off from any timely resupply and facing a general revolt in Greece. 
The stakes were that high. I am not making this case to justify the razing of Thebes; I do so 
merely to illustrate how a complex solution obtained for an equally complex problem that was 
definitely not to everyone’s satisfaction, but which addressed this unique situation in a 
comprehensible way. It was Realpolitik, however dismal the consequences. Had Athens or any 
other city-state truly wanted to save Thebes, then they should have been present to exert their 
influence in one capacity or another.  
 
The fall of Callisthenes of Olynthus is the third and final episode to be considered in depth here. 
It too is particularly fraught with historiographical issues and inconsistencies. Those 
notwithstanding, it also appears to have opened the floodgates of scholarship on a major 
academic debate concerning Alexander. Callisthenes was either Aristotle’s nephew or grand-
nephew. He was known for his antiquarian tendencies but was well-published on historical 
subjects and the natural sciences, in keeping with both Aristotle and Alexander’s interests, prior 
to taking up his post with the latter as well as having made a name for himself through the 
patronage and prominent relationship with the former.93 Callisthenes had been either a fellow 
student or more likely Aristotle’s “teaching assistant” at the Shrine of the Nymphs in Mieza 
(between 343 B.C. and 340 B.C.) where Alexander studied. He would have been well-acquainted 
with his future master, along with his closest Companions, from the time that Alexander was 
about thirteen. Callisthenes had been cultivating his connections with Macedon for years and 
must have been pleased to have been invited as official historian on the Asiatic expedition. He is 
reported to have stated rather pompously that he went along in order to make Alexander’s 
reputation, not his own.94 Since this anecdote comes from Arrian by way of Ptolemy, the 
aspersion against the historian’s character is necessarily suspect, though not beyond belief. Tarn’s 
position is that, in the propaganda wars that accompanied the Wars of the Successors, the 
Peripatetic School, patronised by Cassander, had sought revenge for Callisthenes’ treatment 
through advancing the argument of Alexander the “lucky tyrant”. This stood in marked contrast 
to the idealised position of Alexander the “civiliser”, put forward by his proponents. Neither 
view should be dismissed and that is not my intention here; even so, “each is a judgement after 
the event on Alexander the Conqueror and…each suffers from oversimplification”.95 As stated, 
these positions, in one form or another however transmuted throughout time, remain with us 
still, figuring prominently into virtually all subsequent receptions of Alexander. Such was perhaps 
the price for the punishment inflicted upon a well-connected scholar, whatever his degree of 
culpability for the crime of which he was accused. And that crime, much as with Pausanias and 
the Thebans, was no less than treason.  
It was exceedingly far-sighted of Alexander to bring along an historian to chronicle his 
activities on the march. Would that this work, however flatteringly written it is purported to have 
been, had survived intact to the current era. Be that as it may, Callisthenes left his indelible mark 
on the history and reception of these crucial times. Despite Alexander’s considerable official 
activity, he would have likely cultivated a close rapport with his personal historian, probably 
scrutinising his work before the instalments were relayed back to the homeland.96 It is difficult to 
say what sort of relationship the two men may have had outwith Callisthenes’ professional role; 
although, we do have Plutarch’s report that scholar and monarch engaged in sophisticated games 
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of poetic “verse-topping”, which seems amiable enough but may have also entailed some 
element of mutual animosity.97 It is noteworthy that Arrian reports that Callisthenes comforted 
Alexander after his drunken slaying of his friend and Companion Cleitus the Black, which does 
suggest that some “cordial relations existed between the two men”.98 It is difficult to determine 
Arrian’s source on this and it may well have been Callisthenes himself which would then 
necessarily be questionable. It is also possible to speculate that the Greek literati were regarded 
with some contempt in Alexander’s camp, not by the king himself and his closest Companions 
whose interests were broad and liberal, but by many of his Macedonian associates. The surviving 
fragments of Ptolemy suggest little interest in Greek “high culture” amongst most of their nobles 
and it is noteworthy that, at least in Curtius Rufus’ account, the condemned traitor Philotas had 
to defend himself for favouring Greek cultural traditions over Macedonian ones.99 This sort of 
attitude may have caused Callisthenes to feel like an unwelcome outsider from the beginning of 
the expedition and probably worsened with the passing of time.  
The two occasions on which Callisthenes is reported to have refused proskynesis and, in 
the second instance was denied a kiss from the king, suggests friction at least between the two at 
that stage, if this is not revisionist propaganda. Proskynesis was a Persian custom appropriate to 
the King of Kings, who was not regarded as a living god (rather, he was Ahura Mazda’s vicar on 
earth), but which was problematic for the Greeks inasmuch as such deference was the reserve of 
divinity alone. Although, that too is contested.100 Plutarch and Arrian both agree that Callisthenes 
acted tactlessly on numerous occasions, giving too loud a voice to his criticisms.101 According to 
the former, Aristotle even weighed in with some advice by post, having been informed of his 
relation’s liberality of speech, advising greater caution. During a verbal sparring match performed 
at the behest of the king, Plutarch indicates that the historian was asked to be critical of the 
Macedonians, whom he had just praised to much applause as part of the same sophistic display. 
Callisthenes, whose home city had been razed by Philip in 348, its population along with their 
Athenian allies being sold into slavery, “spoke long and boldly in his palinode…pointing out that 
Philip’s rise to power had occurred due to faction and division amongst the Greeks”, and this 
did not go down well with the assembled company.102 Arrian does not mention this conversation 
in his Anabasis but offers some further details about the historian’s arrogance and criticisms, 
including a negative attitude toward Alexander’s growing Orientalism. He also reports 
anecdotally of a conversation between Philotas, himself eventually implicated for complicity in a 
murder plot against the king, and Callisthenes in which the latter praised the Athenian tyrant 
slayers, Harmodius and Aristogeiton, and strongly implied that such a one in their day would 
surely be given sanctuary in any Greek community that he liked, and moreover “that he would 
be safe in Athens”.103 This must come from Ptolemy’s History and has the scent of revisionism 
about it, setting up both Philotas and Callisthenes for their future betrayals.  The account of the 
palinode in Plutarch is considered by Jacoby to derive from Hermippus and Stroebus.104 We 
know next to nothing about Stroebus but Hermippus, late 3rd century B.C., was directly 
influenced by the Peripatetic school and, as Tarn has emphasised, was hostile to Alexander.105 
 According to Arrian and Plutarch, on one occasion (likely in Marakanda/Samarkand, in 
327) Alexander passed round a “loving cup” (a phialē, associated with religious libations) and 
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those who had agreed to prostration took a sip, bowed and then received a kiss from the king.106 
Plutarch adds another version that states that they bowed before an altar (estia) rather than to the 
king himself. Callisthenes took a sip from the cup but, whilst Alexander was distracted in talking 
with Hephaestion, did not bow but approached the king to receive his kiss. His omission was 
reported by one of the Companions (Demetrius, son of Pythonax, in both versions) and 
Alexander refused to kiss him. It seems somewhat hypocritical of Callisthenes that he declined 
proskynesis given that surviving fragments of his work indicate that he had already been preparing 
the Greeks for Alexander’s deification, which to them would justify prostration.107 It does 
suggest that Callisthenes perhaps resented having to produce his overly flattering, non-academic 
“vanity” piece for Alexander, if it was that.  
Whether, as Brown argues, Callisthenes’ end was inevitable from this point and 
“Alexander controlled himself and awaited a more favourable opportunity” to remove him, after 
the historian had finished his opus, remains uncertain.108 Cartledge agrees with Brown here, saying 
that his “recalcitrance had been noted, and it seems that Alexander was just waiting for a suitable 
opportunity to do away with him”.109 “Callisthenes sealed his fate”, Freeman chimes in chorus, 
adding that Alexander only had to wait for the right time to silence him forever.110 How can they 
know this? Callisthenes had apparently “managed to prevent Alexander from permanently 
introducing the ritual of proskynesis among his Macedonian followers”.111 Following the 
historian’s objections, and the Macedonians’ favourable response to them, we are told that the 
policy of proskynesis was abandoned as untenable amongst the Greeks, though permitted for the 
Persians.112 Perhaps Alexander held a grudge for this check on his authority; but, it was the 
traditional privilege of the Macedonians to have the king take their complaints seriously, and his 
wrath, if any, would not have been limited to Callisthenes alone.113 There is no definitive proof 
that he meditated murder at this stage. None of the primary sources explicitly tell us what 
Alexander was thinking. Like so much of the historiography around these events, the gaps have 
been filled with inference and innuendo. 
The account of the refused kiss is strikingly similar in both Arrian and Plutarch. 
Hammond asserts that both took what elements they wanted of this episode from Chares of 
Mytilene.114 The latter was a Greek who had been appointed court-marshal or “introducer of 
strangers” to the king, an office borrowed from the Persian court. He wrote a History of 
Alexander in ten books, containing many personal details, the fragments of which are mostly 
preserved in Athenaeus of Naucratis’ antiquarian Deipnosophistae (end of A.D. 2nd/beginning of 
A.D. 3rd century). Chares’ History was concerned in the main with court ceremonies and personal 
gossip, including Alexander's abortive attempt at introducing the Persian custom of proskynesis.115 
If Arrian had been unambiguously following Ptolemy or Aristobolus in reporting these events, 
then we might have cause to suspect their authenticity. The fact that both he and Plutarch 
recount the same tale from Chares perhaps suggests some likelihood that Callisthenes’ refusal of 
prostration occurred in reality, that is unless Chares also partially or wholly fabricated it.  
There is sufficient reason to believe that Callisthenes was critical of his monarch both in 
public and in private. His alleged involvement in the Conspiracy of the Pages, resulting in his 
demise, is in connection with this. Arrian and Plutarch describe the disaffection of the Royal 
Pages, led by one Hermolaus, son of Sopolis, who was interested in philosophy and, in 
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consequence, is said to have had some kind of close relationship with Callisthenes.116 Hermolaus 
was humiliatingly flogged after slaying a charging boar during a hunt in Bactria in 327, whose 
killing was to have been reserved for Alexander. Hunting was considered an important part of 
the liberal education afforded to the Royal Pages in exchange for service to their king, and so too 
were courtly manners. Hermolaus had overstepped the bounds and was accordingly punished.117 
Also despairing of their king’s Orientalising tendencies, we are told that the youths, led by an 
outraged Hermolaus, decided to murder Alexander but the plot was foiled through either an 
accident or divine intervention, depending on what one chooses to believe, and somehow 
Callisthenes was implicated.  
This is where the accounts differ, with the Official and Vulgate traditions unsurprisingly 
disagreeing on the issue of testimony against the historian. Arrian tells us that both Aristobolus 
and Ptolemy declare “that the boys said that Callisthenes urged them to commit the crime”.118 
He adds, however, that “most sources” do not mention this. Plutarch, by contrast, writes that 
“even under the ordeal of torture, not one of Hermolaus’ accomplices denounced Callisthenes” 
and that Alexander wrote in a letter to his generals Craterus, Attalus and Alectas stating that the 
boys claimed the conspiracy was none other than their own doing.119 Curtius Rufus, following 
Cleitarchus, gives a much fuller if sensationally elaborated account. Rufus states categorically that 
“Callisthenes was certainly not named as one involved in the plot” although he says that the 
historian did have regular communications with Hermolaus, counselled him after the flogging 
incident to remember that he was a man (whether merely as a comfort or as a call to arms is 
unclear), imputing that Callisthenes probably, through heavy implication, vented some of his 
criticisms of tyranny vis-à-vis Alexander in the presence of the impressionable youth and his 
peers.120 Rufus does not give his source here; indeed, he rarely ever mentions his sources and in 
the instance of Callisthenes’ reputed counsel it is “some say”; but, he is probably following 
Cleitarchus.121 Justin’s Epitome of Trogus connects the historian’s fate to his refusal of proskynesis, 
simply saying that “his opposition proved fatal, both to himself and to other eminent 
Macedonians, who were all put to death on the pretence that they were engaged in a 
conspiracy”.122 This is surely an interpretation; although, given the consistency amongst Vulgate 
sources, it may ultimately derive from Cleitarchus. The story is missing in lacunae from Diodorus, 
although alluded to in his introduction to Book XVII, and we may assume it to have been similar 
to Rufus’ elaborated version, based on their common source.  
 The actual death of Callisthenes is a subject of much debate. Aristobolus, according to 
Arrian, wrote that the historian was dragged in chains wherever the army went and eventually 
died when his health gave way. Ptolemy, by contrast, reported that he was tortured and hanged. 
One can readily imagine Arrian wringing his hands in frustration at these contradictory versions 
when he declares “so we see that even the most trustworthy of writers, men who were in fact 
with Alexander at the time, have related conflicting accounts of infamous events with which they 
must have been perfectly familiar”.123 He also mentions that there are many other conflicting 
reports of his death. Rufus says that Callisthenes died under torture, editorialising that “he was 
innocent of any plot to kill the king, but the sycophantic quality of courtly life did not suit his 
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nature”.124 Plutarch says that “some accounts” indicate he was hanged, others that he was 
“clamped in irons and died of an illness”. Although, he also gives Chares of Mytilene’s version 
which states that Callisthenes was imprisoned for seven months “in order that he be tried by the 
Council of the League of Corinth, in the presence of Aristotle” but that he died in prison “of 
extreme corpulence and the disease of lice”.125  
 There is substantial indication amongst the primary sources that Callisthenes had been 
critical of Alexander and that he indirectly encouraged the conspiracy against the king. Unlike his 
kinsman Aristotle, whose tuition of Alexander had been paid through the reconstitution of his 
home polis of Stageira, which itself had also been destroyed by Philip in 348, Callisthenes had no 
such redress for his annihilated fatherland. Perhaps he still felt bitter. Complaints of his being 
overly critical of his king were made by his detractors.126 Rufus comments that “it was agreed 
that Callisthenes would lend a ready ear to the Pages’ criticisms and accusations” and Arrian says 
that his accusers were eagerly believed when they declared his part in the plan, with some saying 
that “he himself urged them on in their plotting”; Plutarch writes that Lysimachus and Hagnon, 
both high-ranking Macedonian nobles, asserted that the historian had been vocally airing his 
views against despotism to all of the pages who adored him, treating him as if he were the only 
“free man” amongst them.127 It is unclear which source these three authors are using here but 
they appear to have obtained the allegations from a single writer, given their consistency. 
Plutarch also cites a letter, written at a later date, from Alexander to Antipater, his regent in 
Macedon, indicating that the Pages were executed by the Macedonians, but saying “I will punish 
the sophist and those who sent him…along with those who shelter my enemies in the city-
states”.128 Both Brown and Hammond consider this letter to be genuine; Hamilton argues, 
though, that it refers to “new evidence” which came to light incriminating Callisthenes.129  
But is the letter genuine? Or, if so, could it have been referring to a different “sophist”? 
Plutarch clearly believes that it related to Callisthenes; but there is room for doubt. In terms of 
his fate, Hammond argues that Chares’ version of imprisonment with a view to a trial “is 
probably to be believed, because he was a Greek at court and his account was circumstantial”; he 
adds that the captivity of Callisthenes was “developed by later writers into a tale of horror”, 
adding that to be lousy is not in itself debilitating.130 The conditions of his detention were not 
necessarily harsh since we are told that Alexander of Lyncestis, Antipater’s son-in-law who was 
thrice implicated in another plot against the king, was arrested in 334/3 and held prisoner for 
several years prior to his execution in 327.131 And he did not die in prison under similar 
circumstances. Sifting through these diverse and greatly distorted versions, it looks like 
Callisthenes was perhaps too free in giving his opinions about Alexander, if not actually guilty of 
direct treason; although, that remains unproven. This may have encouraged the Pages in their 
attempt. He was probably not executed and he likely died in prison of an unknown illness whilst 
awaiting trial. Given the doubt as to his direct involvement, along with his familial and scholarly 
associations, a trial by a League tribunal in Greece would seem the most prudent, not to mention 
strategic, approach.  
 However Callisthenes actually met his end, it appears to have resulted in an academic 
bombshell that set the tone of virtually all future debates about Alexander. Indeed, had 
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Alexander known the consequences, he might have redoubled his efforts to preserve the 
disgraced historian as “the men of the Academy and the Lyceum now sank their rivalries to 
execrate in concert the martyrdom of free-minded philosophy”, or so says Mary Renault, 
echoing Tarn.132 The immediate impact on the Peripatetic School is clearly indicated in this 
fragment quoted by Cicero: 
 
Mourning the death of his friend, Theophrastus…says that Callisthenes fell in 
with a very powerful and fortunate man, but one who did not understand how to 
use his good fortune.133 
 
This criticism perhaps seems mild, prima facie, but this purported deficit on Alexander’s part here 
could be seen as particularly scornful by the philosophically inclined. Tarn’s argument is that the 
position developed to the effect that Alexander had certainly been very lucky, thus accounting 
for his successes, but was also a ruthless tyrant. This must have appealed to Cassander, who was 
intimately involved with both Athens and the Peripatetics who then, under his auspices, may 
have accordingly produced fitting scholarly invective in defence of their condemned colleague.134 
Stoneman plays down Tarn’s argument of the anti-Alexander rhetoric of the Peripatetics 
as potentially a “kind of category mistake”, contending that Alexander, due to his considerable 
impact on the popular imagination, provided a general subject for philosophical exempla on virtue 
and vice which would be carried on well into the Renaissance. He does at least admit that the 
death of Callisthenes “at the hands of a king is an event likely to impress other philosophers”.135 
Indeed, Mensching also disputed Tarn on the grounds of the limited, hard evidence of any 
Peripatetic backlash.136 The evidence is limited although the circumstances are compelling. We 
have Pausanias’ report that Cassander, who had not participated in the Asian expedition apart 
from having been sent by his father Antipater as part of a deputation to Babylon in 323, close to 
the time of Alexander’s death, and who had been passed over as prospective regent by his own 
father, greatly disliked Alexander.137 Diodorus also indicates that Olympias believed Cassander to 
have been complicit in Alexander’s death and that this in no small part was a major source of 
conflict between them.138 What is more, in 317 BC, the oft-restored Athenian democracy fell, 
arguably for the final time before the modern era, and Cassander in his then capacity as King of 
Macedon and hegemon of the League of Corinth, which he had seized by force of arms and 
duplicity, took a step that Alexander does not seem to have contemplated, even though he had 
ample opportunity as well as cause. Cassander set up a puppet regime of oligarchs and appointed 
one Demetrius of Phaleron as their leader. Demetrius was an Aristotelian and the immediate 
student of Theophrastus, Aristotle’s successor, whose views probably harmonised with 
Cassander’s anti-Alexander position.139 The Lyceum prospered under the patronage of the new 
regime. It also turned out to be fortunate for them, if Tarn is correct, that a negative agenda 
regarding Alexander was compatible with that of the ruling elites at the time.  
The debate over “Alexander the Tyrant” arguably began with Demosthenes’ Philippics, if 
not before; but Callisthenes’ demise perhaps fuelled its “lift-off”, so much so that it is still going 
strong and has ever been since its inception. Others seem to have felt compelled to respond to 
this position and repudiate it. Tarn saw this as being deftly illustrated nearly four centuries later 
in Plutarch’s two epideictic speeches usually referred to as On the Fortune and Virtue of Alexander, 
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in which he strives to refute the “lucky tyrant” thesis, in response to Greek literary and 
philosophical traditions that were well established by that point, through arguing that Alexander 
was a “philosopher in practice” in the truest sense and not always so “fortunate” as many might 
imagine.140 One key passage discusses the Stoic cosmopolitanism of Zeno of Citium (ca. 334 – ca. 
262 B.C.) and attributes the idea originally to Alexander, saying that the latter “ordered them to 
think of the whole inhabited world as their fatherland…all good men as their kinsmen”.141 This 
interpretation is in no small part the basis of Tarn’s positivist view of “Alexander the Civiliser” 
and so too had informed George Grote’s “Unity of Mankind” thesis; although, Schofield argues 
that it is in fact a “misreading” of the original Stoic doctrines.142 Tarn and Wardman saw these 
speeches as Plutarch making “a serious defence against attacks by Stoic philosophers” against 
Alexander; Hamilton opposes this, in part on grounds of contrast with the Life of Alexander, and 
Stoneman, essentially agreeing on the spirit of that position, takes a more circumspect 
approach.143 Brown, whilst acknowledging that Tarn’s argument is based heavily on these two 
speeches of Plutarch, is mildly critical of Hamilton who he notes is self-consciously reiterating 
Badian’s views to the effect that that On the Fortune and Virtue of Alexander is merely “epideictic 
display” with no deeper purpose.144  
In addition to being clearly influenced by a Platonic approach to virtue, Plutarch’s work 
also fuses Roman ideas (Humanitas in particular) with Greek ones, forming a new reception of 
Alexander, although clearly derived from the original arguments, which is not surprising.145 In a 
conversation with Sulochana Asrivatham, a fellow contributor to this volume, she related to me 
the view that these speeches of Plutarch likely represent one of his first attempts at academic 
writing (and Brown agrees on this point),146 as evidenced in no small part by the naïveté of some 
of his arguments in comparison to the relative sophistication of his later works. This seems 
fitting. In my own “Images of Alexander” class, I set this same issue before my students and it is 
remarkable how, influenced by modern receptions, they also tend to fall into one of the two 
principal camps about the Conqueror, repeating and recycling essentially the same positions that 
have been bandied about and hotly contested since they sprang forth, like the evils of Pandora’s 
box, in the immediate aftermath of the Macedonian Conqueror. Much as with a Socratic 
dialogue, we can only achieve aporia here with recourse to these scholarly arguments, however 
well-constructed. It seems reductive but one only has to pick a side and the necessary scholarship 
will “flow” towards sustaining it. None of this clarifies the fate of Callisthenes or Alexander’s 
intentions. Their discernible impact on the scholarship, whatever Tarn and his proponents may 
argue, remains contentiously indeterminate, if albeit decidedly suggestive. 
 
There are many, many more episodes that we could consider in examining the receptions of 
“Alexander the Civiliser” versus “Alexander the Lucky Tyrant”. These might include, but are by 
no means limited to, the sieges of Tyre and Gaza, the burning of the royal palace at Persepolis, 
the trial and execution of Philotas, the assassination of Parmenion, the slaughter of the Indian 
mercenaries, the Exiles’ Decree and the so-called “Reign of Terror” in ca. 321-323. Each is 
fraught with historiographical controversy, different versions in the sources and contrasting 
interpretations and receptions in the subsequent scholarship. Each one might serve to prove 
Alexander a tyrant or otherwise. Indeed, the episodes discussed in this chapter could have been 
dealt with in considerably more detail than I have had space to attend to here. But my aim was to 
use the examples of Philip’s assassination, the fate of Thebes and of Callisthenes in order to 
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illustrate at once both the shape of the central debates concerning Alexander, along with some of 
their root causes and ramifications, as well as to offer my own reception, which is also an 
interpretation, of these events. In so doing I am well aware that I too have engaged in acts of 
insinuation and implication at least as much as those sources whom I have availed, while at the 
same time calling them to account when it seemed to me that they had erred through one form 
of prejudice or another. Doubtless others will requite my sins in kind.  
 As I have sought to demonstrate, scholars have been vehemently contesting the truth 
about Alexander since before his untimely death. Virtually all have done so under the sway of 
one type of agenda or another, as they continue to do. Taking all of that into account, what 
follows is the frame of the debate. We have no fully extant sources from primary witnesses, nor 
from Alexander himself, except in very limited, fragmentary and/or epistolary form, all of which 
are contested by modern scholarship to one degree or another, with those that are accepted 
being subject to many preconditions and interpretations. We do have the Greek-born, Roman 
general and governor Arrian of Nicomedia’s selected, summarised and paraphrased elements 
drawn largely from Alexander’s Companions, the Pharaoh and historian Ptolemy I Soter, son of 
Lagus, Aristobolus the engineer, Admiral Nearchus and sometimes Chares of Mytilene, 
“introducer of foreigners”, along with a handful of others, most of whom were eyewitnesses but 
all of whom had various agendas of their own which often play out in their works. And much of 
that too is contested. We also have the Roman Quintus Curtius Rufus, probably writing in the 
reign of Claudius and influenced in his attitudes towards tyranny by Caligula and/or Nero, the 
Romanised Celt Trogus (by way of another, later Roman Justin) and the Sicilian-Greek Diodorus 
reporting on their receptions of mainly the Alexandrian scholar Cleitarchus, Chares again, the 
navigator cum “admiral” Onisicritus, the Peripatetic Callisthenes and a few others, some of whom 
were eyewitnesses but not most. Cleitarchus accessed some eyewitness accounts from 
Alexander’s veterans; but all of the Vulgate sources, again, had contested agendas. It further 
complicates matters that both traditions share Callisthenes, to varying extents, as a primary 
source. And we have the Platonist Plutarch re-interpreting all of the above primary source, plus 
some more, through his philosophical lens and through the influence of Romanitas. We have the 
reported political propaganda of Cassander of Macedon along with scholarly positions, 
invectives, and their refutations, by Athenian and other intellectual elites. Virtually all of this 
derives from a positive or negative stance towards Alexander. They started the debate and we 
have it today through the receptions of Grote, Tarn, Badian, Renault, Cartledge, Fox &c. & al., 
too many to name here, each influenced by events of their eras, each aligning with one side or 
another, in varying degrees, according to their dispositions and, to be sure, their scholarly 
acumen.  
 When St. John Chrysostom, Bishop of Constantinople (A. D. 347-407), asked his flock, 
“Tell me, where is the tomb (sema) of Alexander? Show it me and tell me the day on which he 
died”, his purpose was to underscore the futility of a world in which even the greatest of 
individuals could be lost to history.147 He was probably certain that no one at that time would be 
able to answer his question. To ask “Who is the real Alexander?” is surely begging to be met 
with a similar response. That is not to say that archaeologists will not one day locate his tomb, or 
that scholars may not at some time discover the “truth” about the Macedonian World 
Conqueror. For the moment, though, we are quite literally framed by the debate, caught up in its 
receptions and receptions of receptions, which are no less interesting than the truth and which 
go on to form their own kind of truth about those who make them and those who subscribe to 
them. Perhaps the real Greatness of Alexander resides in the fact that, through his earth-
shatteringly monumental life and contentiously influential acts which divide us still in terms of 
their significance, he has held up a speculum in which we may, if nothing else, at least discover 
ourselves. And that is truly Great.  
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